Systems that assign school places face a difficult trade-off. Some, such as the lottery-based method Amsterdam uses (Random Serial Dictatorship), are designed so that honest reporting is the best strategy, but can still place students at a school far down their list. Other systems give more students a place at one of their preferred schools overall, while also making it worthwhile to rank schools strategically rather than by genuine preference.

Tasnim studied an alternative method, rank-minimising matching, which gives more weight to student preferences. This generally improves outcomes, but introduces a new risk: families with more information or confidence can adjust their preference lists strategically and gain an advantage over families who simply report their true preferences. Additional policies, such as Amsterdam’s placement guarantee, can unintentionally encourage this behaviour as well.

Still, a survey of 140 Amsterdam parents found that clearly explaining the risks of strategic reporting can discourage people from doing it. According to Tasnim, this shows that fair school placement is not purely a technical matter. How clearly a system is communicated also determines whether it works fairly in practice. Her research points to no single, simple replacement for Amsterdam’s current system, but underlines that any proposed changes need to be tested thoroughly before they are introduced.